Escroto de bom.
Escroto de bom.
BMW ganha, hein?? E o registro do usuário no sistema é pra deixar vagabundo boquiaberto.
Via Fast Company
Mais uma experimentação foda do MIT.
Here’s a demo of the Junkyard Jumbotron, created by Rick Borovoy at MIT’s Center for Future Civic Media. It’s a cool app to allow you to gang up multiple screens (phones, tablets, flat panels), running any OS, and turn them into a single, joined display. It’s very clever: you arrange the screens as desired and then display a web-page with a QR code on each of them; snap a picture and send it back to the server and the server takes any image you feed it and splits it across the screens. No client-side software needed, apart from a browser.
Via Boing Boing
Muito foda o memorando que o novo CEO da Nokia, Stephen Elop, mandou aos seus funcionários:
There is a pertinent story about a man who was working on an oil platform in the North Sea. He woke up one night from a loud explosion, which suddenly set his entire oil platform on fire. In mere moments, he was surrounded by flames. Through the smoke and heat, he barely made his way out of the chaos to the platform’s edge. When he looked down over the edge, all he could see were the dark, cold, foreboding Atlantic waters.
As the fire approached him, the man had mere seconds to react. He could stand on the platform, and inevitably be consumed by the burning flames. Or, he could plunge 30 meters in to the freezing waters. The man was standing upon a “burning platform,” and he needed to make a choice.
He decided to jump. It was unexpected. In ordinary circumstances, the man would never consider plunging into icy waters. But these were not ordinary times – his platform was on fire. The man survived the fall and the waters. After he was rescued, he noted that a “burning platform” caused a radical change in his behaviour.
We too, are standing on a “burning platform,” and we must decide how we are going to change our behaviour.
Over the past few months, I’ve shared with you what I’ve heard from our shareholders, operators, developers, suppliers and from you. Today, I’m going to share what I’ve learned and what I have come to believe.
I have learned that we are standing on a burning platform.
And, we have more than one explosion – we have multiple points of scorching heat that are fuelling a blazing fire around us.
Foda, né? Tem mais paulada.
The first iPhone shipped in 2007, and we still don’t have a product that is close to their experience. Android came on the scene just over 2 years ago, and this week they took our leadership position in smartphone volumes. Unbelievable.
Para lançar o Punto Evo, o carro mais tecnológico da Fiat na Espanha, a Leo Burnett Iberia encontrou uma solução bem interessante: foi criado um aplicativo de iPhone e Android que lê as placas de trânsito (da mesma maneira como se lê um QR Code) e associa a cada uma uma característica do carro.
Assim, ao apontar o celular para a placa que diz PARE o app dirá que o Punto Evo tem o melhor sistema de freios da categoria. Se é uma placa de curva, veremos como o modelo vem com um sistema de luzes que facilita as curvas… e por aí vai. O app também mostra onde fica e traça a rota para a concessionária mais próxima para conhecer o carro ao vivo e até fazer um test-drive.
Mas, como ninguém dá muita bola para catálogo, eles fizeram com que o Fiat Street Evo se tornasse, além disso, um jogo. Foram escondidos prêmios incríveis atrás de algumas placas como iPads e viagens O primeiro a encontrar é quem ganha, criando um senso de urgência e convidando à ação.
Aí embaixo tem alguns trechos de um dos posts mais fodas que eu já li, uma verdadeira aula magna sobre negócios. Na verdade é uma baita análise sobre a RIM, responsável pelo blackberry e que se encontra em uma bela sinuca de bico, apesar de faturar astronômicos 15 bilhões por ano. Mas a melhor parte é quando o cara fala sobre seu antigo trabalho na Apple para explicar a situação da RIM.
When I worked at Apple, I spent a lot of time studying failed computer platforms. I thought that if we understood the failures, we might be able to prevent the same thing from happening to us.
I looked at everything from videogame companies to the early PC pioneers (companies like Commodore and Atari), and I found an interesting pattern in their financial results. The early symptoms of decline in a computing platform were very subtle, and easy for a business executive to rationalize away. By the time the symptoms became obvious, it was usually too late to do anything about them.
The symptoms to watch closely are small declines in two metrics: the rate of growth of sales, and gross profit per unit sold (gross margins). Here’s why:
Every computing platform has a natural pool of customers. Some people need or want the platform, and some people don’t. Your product spreads through its pool of customers via the traditional “diffusion” process — early enthusiasts first, late adopters at the end.
It’s relatively easy to get good revenue from the early adopters. They seek out innovations like yours, and are willing to pay top dollar for it. As the market for a computer system matures, the early adopters get used up, and the company starts selling to middle adopters who are more price-sensitive. In response to this, the company cuts prices, which results in a big jump in sales. Total revenue goes up, and usually overall profits as well. Everybody in the company feels good.
Time passes, and that middle portion of the market gets consumed. Eventually demand growth starts to drop, and you make another price cut. Sales go up again, sometimes a lot. With revenue rising, you and your investors talk proudly about the benefits of reaching the “mainstream” market.
What you don’t realize at this point is that you’re not “reaching the mainstream,” you’re actually consuming the late adopters. Unfortunately, it’s very difficult to tell when you’re selling to the late adopters. They don’t wear signs. Companies tend to assume that because the adoption curve is drawn as a smooth-sided bell, your demand will tail off at the end as gradually as it built up in the beginning. But that isn’t how it works. At the start, you are slowly building up momentum from a base of nothing. That takes years. But by the time you saturate the market you have built up huge sales momentum. You have a strong brand, you have advertising, you have a big distribution channel. You’ll gulp through the late adopters really rapidly. The result is that sales continue to grow until they drop suddenly, like a sprinter running off the edge of a cliff.
Until you get close to the end, your revenue keeps rising, enabling you to tell yourself that the business is still in good shape. But eventually you reach the dregs of the market, and sales will flatten out, or maybe even start to drop. You cut prices again, but this time they don’t increase demand because there are no latent customers left. All the cuts do is reduce further the revenue you get from selling upgrades to your installed base. The combination of price cuts and declining sales produces a surprisingly rapid drop in revenue and profits. If you want to make a profit (which your investors demand), your only choice is to make massive cuts in expenses. Those cuts usually end up eliminating the risky new product ideas that are your only hope of re-igniting demand.
At Apple I called this the platform “death spiral” because once you get into it, the expense cuts and sales declines reinforce each other. It’s almost impossible to reverse the process, unless you’re Steve Jobs and you get very lucky.
The best way to survive is to stay away from the cliff edge in the first place. But that means you need to be hyper-attentive to small changes in sales growth and gross margins.
Um aplicativo a altura do Flipboard. É sobre a história do jazz, e a interface é embasbacante.
Depois do Nike +, a AKQA apresenta NTC. Os malucos de arte de lá tem um bom gosto avassalador.