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Sabe aquele maluco do Uruguai que impediu com as mãos o gol de Gana, no último minuto da prorrogação (o ganês perdeu o pênalti e a decisão foi para as penalidades, com vitória da Celeste)? Pois bem, vejam que análise foda:

My own view is that this is not “cheating.” It seems to me “cheating,” in its colloquial understanding, involves not just breaking the rules but attempting to prevent others from discovering you’ve done so. What happened in that game was what I would call “rational rule breaking.” There was no intent to deceive; the Uruguayan player knew the only chance he had to save the game was to break the rules, and accept the penalty, and hope the Ghanans missed the penalty kick. True cheaters don’t wish to break the rules and accept the penalty, they just wish to break the rules and avoid the penalty.

f I want to cheat at cards, say by dealing off the bottom of the deck, I’m going to do it in such a way that attempts to mask what I’m up to. I’m not going to make it obvious what I’m doing becasue I do not wish to accept the penalty. Rational rule breaking, by contrast, is done with a clear understanding of the costs and benefits and not just a willingness to be caught, but an actual positive desire to get caught because the penalty is worth preventing the outcome that will come from following the rules.

Eu acho essa análise foda, mas tem uma ironia aí: a última coisa que o cara fez foi um ato racional, naqueles milésimos de segundo ele não conseguiu pensar em porra nenhuma, foi mais instinto do que razão. Escroto seria se o juiz não tivesse visto e ele não se acusasse.

The relevance for broader social theory, I think, is that in dealing with both forms of rule breaking we need to ask whether such behavior does indeed indicate that the rule is bad. But for true cheating, the question is likely to have much more to do with the costs of detection and enforcement, while for rational rule breaking, it will be about how frequently the behavior takes place and whether any attempt to tweak the rule to prevent such scenarios will be more costly than living with the status quo… Rational rule breaking may not be so easy to prevent or change, and the costs of trying to address the “black swans” situations that cause it might well turn out to be greater than the costs of the status quo.

Um final foda:

Uruguay should be treating Luis Suarez as a national hero not a cheater, and we economists should thank him for a wonderful classroom example about cost/benefit analysis.

Via Noah brier

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